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Selling not standardized goods such as jewelry, works of art and houses, by English
auction is a revenue maximizing choice. The superiority of auctions in terms of maxi-
mizing a seller’s revenue has been largely acknowledged in the literature. One reason
for this superiority is that, in quite general environments, auctions, such as the English
auction, are efﬁcient. They guarantee that the item on sale will end up in the hands of
the one who values it the most. Moreover the auction price (i.e. the seller’s revenue)
is such that no other bidder would be willing to pay as much or more. Thus, in the
presence of serious buyers, using an efﬁcient auctions is a rational choice. Whether
this remains true when a seller may fail to gather any serious buyer is not clear. Al-
lowing for some inefﬁcient allocations, by potentially selling to bidders having lower
values, is one way for the seller to attract some buyers. Thus it is one way to reduce
the risk of not selling at all. Most of the literature considers monopolistic sellers who
face some demand. Thus the consequences of a substantial risk of no-sale has received
little attention. This paper attempts to ﬁll this gap by considering competing sellers
offering horizontally differentiated products. In particular, the paper offers a rational
explanation for resorting to inefﬁcient allocations under market share uncertainty.
This paper was motivated by observing the housing market in Dublin (Ireland).
High quality houses in Dublin are generally sold by English auction. Towards the end
1of the year 2000 a sudden change was observed. Auctions were abandoned and private
treaty was used more and more often. The reason proposed by a national newspaper
was the following. The sharp increase in the price of high quality houses led many
owners to sell their property but at the same time reduced the number of potential buy-
ers. In such an environment, auctions were performing particularly poorly at achieving
a sale. From a theoretical point of view, it appeared that the fear of not selling led sell-
ers to abandon an efﬁcient mechanism for one (private treaty) offering the possibility
to meet and deal with a possibly reduced number of interested buyers: the ﬁrst ones
who come to view the house.
The literature considering competing sellers (see McAfee (1993), Peters (1997)) de-
parts very much from the issue we will address here. Such papers analyze the proper-
ties of decentralized competition in an auction context. They examine the convergence
of the reserve prices in second price auctions which reﬂect prices in a Walrasian equi-
librium. Thus, this literature is not related with the issue we intend to understand.
In his empirical study focusing on the housing market Lusht (1996) shows that, in an
active market, auctions extract higher prices than private negotiations. However, he
acknowledges the fact that he considers an active market. In the conclusion, he men-
tions the risk of no sale and suggests that this risk could explain the use of private
negotiation. In the early literature allowing for endogenous entry, the importance of
guaranteeing fruition is also mentioned in Harstad (1990). In his paper, the author
compares the revenue from different types of common value auctions under free en-
try. Under free entry, gathering more bidders can lower a seller’s revenue. Indeed, an
auction attracting fewer participants gives each of them a greater probability of win-
ning. Thus, in equilibrium each participant will settle for a lower expected proﬁt upon
winning. This means that, provided the seller attracts some interested bidders, less can
be better than more. This remains true provided selling is sufﬁciently likely. Harstad
(1990) considers a situation where the risk of not selling at all sets a constraint on the
optimal number of bidders. The situation considered in this paper is one in which more
bidders is always better than less. The risk of not selling affects the extend to which a
seller may want to preserve efﬁciency.
The trade-off between efﬁcient allocation and selling at all is at the center of Gilbert
and Klemperer (2000). Using a theoretical model they prove that the fear of no sale can
lead a monopoly to ration demand. In their model, demand is subject to buyers under-
taking some initial investment and subject to this investment being successful. They
2show that a seller can beneﬁt from committing to a ﬁxed price, potentially lower than
the market clearing price, provided this price leads both buyers to invest. In an auction
environment their result suggests that a seller can increase his revenue by allowing for
inefﬁcient allocations if doing so increases entry. In what follows we consider compet-
ing sellers instead of a monopoly. Competition brings to light some interesting results
that a monopoly setting fails to capture. First it highlights the key role of the degree
of product differentiation. This parameter determines what should be the primary in-
terest for the seller: selling at all or extracting rents. Second it shows how competition
can lead all sellers to resort to inefﬁcient allocations. In such a situation the potential
beneﬁts from inefﬁcient allocations vanish but not their cost.
The model considered is very simple. I consider a situation where 2 sellers, each
with an item to sell, face 2 potentially interested buyers. The items on sale are hori-
zontally differentiated. Under this assumption, each buyer shows a preference for one
item over the other. This is modelled using the traditional Hotelling model where the
2 sellers are located at the extremity of a line of symbolic length equal to 1. The 2
buyers are located between the 2 sellers. A buyer located closer to seller 1 has a higher
willingness to pay for seller 1’s item. The position of a buyer is private information.
The game analyzed is sequential. First, both sellers decide simultaneously and non-
cooperatively on which mechanism to use and announce it. Second, the buyers decide
simultaneously and non-cooperatively on which seller to attend. We assume that there
is only one period and that a buyer can attend one seller at most. We restrict attention
to 2 mechanisms only referred to as auction and private treaty. The auction is assumed
to be an English auction. Private treaty is modeled as a potentially inefﬁcient auction.
With probability α all interested buyers will submit an offer which are then confronted
until one drops out, in which case the outcome is the same as the auction. With prob-
ability (1 − α) the seller deals with at most one buyer to whom he sells the house for
the lowest acceptable price. This buyer is potentially the one who values the good the
least. Thus, private treaty is potentially inefﬁcient. If a seller has no interested buyer in
his market he must keep the good which is of no value to him. I do not incorporate here
some cost of using any of the 2 mechanisms. The reason is that I intend to ﬁnd deter-
minant for inefﬁcient allocations that are not cost-related. In Dublin, when the sellers
abandoned auction, there was no increase in the relative cost of one mechanism. It did
not become more expensive to auction relative to using private treaty. Thus, the reason
for the change lies somewhere else.
3The results are rather intuitive and interesting. First, the degree of product differ-
entiation intervenes in an unusual and crucial way. In a traditional Hotelling model,
the more differentiated the products are the more reluctant the buyers are to purchase
their less favored item. This reduced mobility of buyers enables to sellers to exert
some monopoly power. Using this logical argument, we could expect that a lower mo-
bility enables the seller to use the efﬁcient auction mechanism. Interestingly, in what
follows, the market share (and thus mobility) is independent of product differentiation.
Thus, the reasoning is slightly different. As we shall see that the degree of product dif-
ferentiation determines what should be the primary preoccupation of the seller: market
share or rent extraction. As intuition suggests, when products are more homogeneous,
market share should come ﬁrst. By opposition, as the degree of product differentiation
increases, rent extraction is the priority. In equilibrium we then observe the following.
For low degrees of product differentiation, there are 2 possible equilibrium conﬁgura-
tions. Either private treaty is the only dominant strategy equilibrium or the two sym-
metric equilibria in which auction or private treaty are used by both buyers co-exist.
In any case, the best reply to private treaty is never auction. This is so because auction
would decrease a seller’s market share when his opponent is allowing for inefﬁciency.
And when the degree of product differentiation is low, a seller never wants to decrease
his market share. For higher degrees of product differentiation, there are again 2 possi-
ble equilibrium conﬁgurations. Either auction forms a dominant strategy equilibrium
or the two symmetric equilibria in which auction or private treaty are used by both
buyers co-exist. In any case, the best reply to auction is never private treaty. This is
so because private treaty would increase a seller’s market share when his opponent is
using auction at the expense of efﬁciency. And when the degree of product differenti-
ation is high enough, a seller never wants to extend his market share if it means losing
on efﬁciency. When the consumers are evenly spread over the market, the equilibrium
in which private treaty is played forms a prisoner’s dilemma. Indeed, as the sellers
both use the same mechanism (whether it is auction or private treaty) they share the
market in halves. Thus, they both lose on efﬁciency when they both use private treaty
as opposed to both using auction. By opposition, the dominant strategy equilibrium
in which auction is adopted is Pareto efﬁcient. Finally the parameter α plays a role
for intermediate values of the degree of product differentiation. The two symmetric
equilibria arise for lower values of α. In one case, when product differentiation is low
enough, it is because the best reply to auction ceases to be private treaty when the latter
4is too inefﬁcient. In the other case, when product differentiation is more important, it
is because the best reply to private treaty ceases to be auction when the latter induces
a too large market share loss.
The following section describes the model. The game is then solved by back-
wards induction to identify the subgame perfect equilibria. We ﬁrst consider the buyers
whose decisions are perfectly anticipated by the sellers. Finally, before we conclude,
we look at all market equilibria and analyze their property.
2 The model
Consider a market with 2 consumers and 2 sellers (1 and 2). Each seller has a single
item on sale (e.g. a house). These items are horizontally differentiated. Consumers are
characterized by their taste (θ ∈ [0,1]) which gives a measure for their willingness to
pay for each item. A consumer with taste θ is willing to pay v1 (θ) and v2 (θ) for seller
1 and seller 2 item respectively. Assume
v1 (θ) = v − tθ,
v2 (θ) = v − t(1 − θ),
where v and t are positive. The variable t is a measure of product differentiation.
It is common knowledge. Graphically, this situation can be represented as a Hotelling
situation with sellers located at the extremities of a line of length 1. We assume that the
lowest valuation for each item (v−t) is, in this model, the highest price that guarantees
a sale. We will then assume that (v − t) is the seller’s reservation price..
Thesellercandecideonhowtoselltheiritem. Twopossibilitieswillbeconsidered.
First he can hold an English auction. To simplify we consider the following rule. The
seller starts with a price equal to (v − t). Then (if there is more than a single buyer)
the seller raises the price. Buyers can stay in or drop out as the price raises. If they
drop out, they give up the possibility of trading. The price raises until a single buyer
remains. He gets the item and pays the price at which his last competitor dropped out.
If the seller has committed to use an auction and if there is a single buyer initially, this
buyer is the winner and pays (v − t).
As an alternative, the seller can choose to use a private treaty. We will model this using
a parameter α ∈ [0,1]. In practice, one can interpret α as the probability that the house
5remains on sale long enough after the ﬁrst visit (if any) for any other interested buyer
to see it. (This parameter could also refer to the seller’s possibility of being patient.)
In a context with 2 buyers, the following happens. With probability α all (at most
both) interested buyers will make an offer. The seller will confront their offers until
one drops out. With probability (1−α) the item will be sold to the ﬁrst buyer to show
up (if any). We will assume that if both are interested, the closest consumer meets the




Each buyer privately observes his own taste. However, it is common knowledge
that tastes are i.i.d. according to a distribution function F(θ) deﬁned over [0,1]. Let
F(.) be differentiable and let f (θ) denote the density function. When attending the
auction, the buyers are able to assess how many competitors they face (although they
do not need this information to know at what price they should drop out). We ﬁnally
make the assumption that α and β are common knowledge.
In what follows I want to abstract from cost related explanations and will therefore
not include the cost of either mechanisms in the analysis. We also do not consider that
a seller beneﬁts from some reputation by considering equal transport costs.
The timing of the game is the following. First, Nature draws each buyer’s taste
(refer to as a type). Second, both sellers simultaneously announce what selling mecha-
nism they intend to use. Third, the buyers decide which seller to deal with. To simplify
I will assume that a buyer can only deal with 1 of the 2 sellers. Finally, trade (if any)
takes place.
3 The buyers’ game
A buyer attending an auction will have to calculate a bid unless he is alone. Given the
auction’s rule, it is trivial to show that a dominant strategy for the buyer consists in
dropping out whenever the price reaches his true valuation (see Milgrom (1989)). This
decision maximizes forms a dominant strategy equilibrium. If the buyer is alone he
will pay (v − t) for the item and has no strategic decision to take. A buyer attending a
private treaty will follow a similar strategy if needed. With probability (1−α) the item
is sold to the buyer coming ﬁrst. In that case, the ﬁrst to see it should propose a price
equal to (v − t) as it is the lowest acceptable price. He will not be asked to increase
it and cannot improve his gain. With probability α the private treaty mechanism is
similar to an auction. If there is only one interested buyer he will just propose a price
6equal to (v − t) which will be accepted and paid. If both buyers are interested, offers
will raise until they reach the lowest valuation. The buyer having the highest valuation
will get the house for that price.
Consider now the decision on which seller to attend. Let S = (s1,s2) denote the strate-
gies used by seller 1 and 2 respectively. We have S ∈ {(A,A),(A,P),(P,A),(P,P)}
where A stands for auction and P for private treaty.
Proposition 1: For all possible sellers’ strategies, there will always exist a treshold
value θ∗
S ∈ [0,1] such that the following strategy forms a symmetric Nash equi-
librium: all buyers with a valuation θ ≤ θ∗
S deal with seller 1, while all buyers
with a valuation θ ≥ θ∗
S deal with seller 2.
Proof: see Appendix 1.
The variable θ∗
S is crucial as it determines each seller’s market share.
Lemma 1: In the model considered, the equilibrium market shares only depend on
thevariablesα andβ. Inparticular, theyareindependentofthedegreeofproduct
differentiation1. (Proof: see Appendix 1)
The main assumption triggering this result is that minimum acceptable price is
(v−t). Under this assumption, a buyer’ surplus is always proportional to t. Moreover,
we did not allow for any reputation effect by which one seller would beneﬁt from
a lower transport cost. This result is interesting. In the traditional Hotelling model,
as products become more different, consumers are more reluctant to attend suppliers
further away. This gives their closest supplier more monopoly power and enables
him to charge higher prices. In what follows, although product differentiation plays a
crucial role it is not via this traditional argument. Instead market share depends only
on which mechanisms are offered and on the variables α and β.
Lemma 2:At α = 1 and/or β = 1, θ∗
AA = θ∗
PP.
Lemma 3: Under strategies (A,P) and (P,A), the market share to the seller using
private treaty has the following properties:
(i) It decreases with α, and equals θ∗
AA at α = 1.
(ii) It decreases with β, and equals θ∗
AA at β = 1.
1This also holds under quadratic transport costs.
7When α = 1, private treaty is the same as auction since all interested buyers get
to confront their offers. When β = 1, the buyer with the highest valuation will be the
one getting the item, just as in the auction process. Given those two points, lemma 2 is
obvious. Lemma 3 highlights a key feature of this analysis. It shows that a seller can
beneﬁt from an inefﬁcient sale. Indeed, as a seller allows the lower valuation buyer to
get the item, he increases his market share. As we shall see, the gain in market share
can, in some instances, more than compensate the loss in efﬁciency.











PA = 1 − θ
∗
AP.
The sellers share the market in halves when both use the same mechanism when
the median is situated at
1
2
. In general, market shares depend on how the population is
spread. Thus, market equilibria are affected by the types’ distribution. In what follows
we will focus at a market where consumers are evenly spread.
4 The sellers’ game
The game being symmetric, we can focus at seller 1 only. Seller 1’s proﬁt can always
be written as an expression which is proportional to v. Therefore there is no loss in
generalities to consider the proﬁt as a function of T, where T =
t
v
and T ∈ [0,1] by
construction. Deﬁne the function Π(θ,α) as:
Π(θ,α) = a(θ)(1 − T) + αTb(θ), (1)
where
a(θ) = F (θ)(2 − F (θ)) (2)
and
b(θ) = (F (θ))
2











8Let πS(s1,s1) denote the seller’s proﬁts under strategy (s1,s2). We have:
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Note that the parameter β, reﬂecting the probability of dealing with the highest
type under private treaty only matters indirectly to the seller. This is so because when
the seller deals with the ﬁrst buyer he meets, the price equals (v − t) whoever gets
the item. In a more general model, where the seller potentially sells the object to the
highest bidder within a subset of all interested buyers, such a parameter would matter.
The proﬁt’s expression can be understood as follows. The expression a(θ) is the
probability of fruition. It is the probability that seller 1 will face at least one buyer. If
this is the case, she will get the minimum acceptable price for sure. Let us now turn to
b(θ). The expression (F (θ∗
S))
2 is the probability with which both buyers attend seller
1. Under auction, this would allow her to get rents in addition to the minimum accept-
able price. Those rents can be extracted under private treaty only when all interested
buyers confront their offers. These rents are given by the expression in brackets in (3).
Note that if the items for sale are identical (T = 0) the sellers get no informational
rents. Thus some degree of product differentiation is needed for the seller to extract
rents.
Lemma 5: Expression (1) shows that the degree of product differentiation of product
differentiation determines whether the seller should care about selling at all or
about extracting rents. As T converges to T = 1, guaranteeing fruition becomes
less important. Instead, the seller should focus on extracting rents.
This lemma is just an observation. However it is of critical importance to under-
stand the results that follow. Before we search for the market equilibria, note that this
game is symmetric. Thus there will always exist at least one equilibrium in pure strate-
gies. Unfortunately, the comparison of the seller’s revenue under different strategies is,
in general, complicated. Therefore we will analyze the situation under the following
assumptions.
• Assumption 1: ∀θ, F(1 − θ) = 1 − F (θ).








PA = 1 − θ
∗
AP.
• Assumption 2: Let θα ≡ θPA and b θα ≡ θAP. Assume that the distribution
function is such that the functions gA(α) deﬁned as
gA(α) =
a(θα) − a(θ1)
a(θα) − a(θ1) + b(θ1) − αb(θα)
is increasing in α, and such that the function gP(α) deﬁned as
gP(α) =
a(b θ1) − a(b θα)
a(b θ1) − a(b θα) + b(b θα) − αb(b θ1)
is decreasing in α.
This assumption holds in particular under the uniform distribution. It states the fol-
lowing. Let T A
α (resp. T P
α ) denote the degree of product differentiation such that seller
1 is indifferent between auction and private treaty when seller 2 uses auction (resp.
private treaty). Under assumption 2, T A
α is increasing in α, while T P
α is decreasing in
α. Thus, assumption is similar to a monotonicity condition on the degree of product
differentiation.
4.1 Best reply to auction
Assume that seller 2 is using an Auction. If seller 1 uses the same mechanism, they
sharethemarket. Ifheswitchestoprivatetreaty, helosesonefﬁciencybutgainsmarket
share. The best reply to auction will depend on the degree of product differentiation
and the efﬁciency loss measured via α.
Proposition 2: Under assumption 2, there exist T1A ∈ ]0,1[ and T2A ∈ ]0,1[ with
T1A < T2A, and αA ∈ ]0,1[ such that the best reply to auction is:
-Private treaty for all α, when T < T1A
-Auction for all α when T > T2A
-Auction for α < αA and Private treaty for α ≥ αA when T ∈ [T1A,T2A].
Proof: See Appendix 2.
The graphical representation represents the result described in proposition 2.
10Figure 1: Best reply to auction.
When products are sufﬁciently different, it never pays to increase market share.
It only does as products become closer substitutes. The parameter α plays a crucial
role when T ∈ [T1A,T2A]. In that case, private treaty is a best reply to auction only
when not too inefﬁcient. That is when the gain in market share is not dissipated by the
inefﬁciency.
4.2 Best Reply to Private Treaty
Assume seller 2 is using private treaty. If seller 1 uses the same mechanism, they share
the market. If seller 1 switches to auction, he will lose market share. Once again, the
best reply to private treaty depends on T and on α.
Proposition 3: Under assumption 2, there exist T1P ∈ ]0,1[ and T2P ∈ ]0,1[ with
T1P < T2P, and αP ∈ ]0,1[ such that the best reply to private treaty is:
-Private treaty for all α, when T < T1P
-Auction for all α when T > T2P
-Private treaty for α < αP and auction for α ≥ αP when T ∈ [T1P,T2P].
Proof: See Appendix 3.
The following graphs represent the best replies as T increases.
11Figure 2: Best reply to private treaty.
Once again, when products are sufﬁciently different, gaining efﬁciency compen-
sates the loss in market share. The role of α is now slightly different. When T ∈
[T1B,T2B], the seller chooses private treaty for low values of α, eventhough it is quite
inefﬁcient. When α is low, the market share from auction is not large enough to out-
weight the efﬁciency gain. In other words, auction becomes a best reply to private
treaty for T ∈ [T1B,T2B], provided the market it generates is wide enough.
5 Market equilibria
Under assumption 1 we have T2A = T1B (see Appendix 4). Let T ∗ = T2A = T1B.
Putting together all best replies leads us to the following result.
Proposition 4: The market equilibria depend on α and T. They are such that:
-Auction is a dominant strategy equilibrium either for T > T2B, or for T ∈
[T ∗,T2B] provided α > αP.
-Private treaty is a dominant strategy equilibrium either for T < T1A, or for
T ∈ [T1A,T ∗] provided α > αA.
-The symmetric equilibria (A,A) and (P,P) form a Nash equilibrium either
for T ∈ [T1A,T ∗] provided α ≤ αA, or for T ∈ [T ∗,T2B] provided α ≤ αP. (The
12Figure 3: Market equilibria.
proof is trivial.)
The following graph gives a clearer idea of the equilibria.
Those results can be interpreted as follows. For T < T ∗, that is when products
are rather homogeneous, there are two possible conﬁgurations of equilibria. Either
private treaty forms a dominant strategy equilibrium or, the two symmetric equilibria
co-exist. In any case, auction is never a best reply to private treaty. In other words,
when T < T ∗, the seller is never willing to give up market share. This aversion to lose
market share can drive both sellers to resort to inefﬁcient allocations. In such a case,
they would share the market in halve just as they would under (A,A), and both lose.
This is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 6: The equilibrium payoff at (P,P) is dominated by the equilibrium pay-
off at (A,A).
Proof: By construction we have πS(P,P) ≤ πS (A,A) for all α, with equality at
α = 1 only.
13Whenever (P,P) forms a dominant strategy equilibrium, the sellers reach a so-
called prisoner’s dilemma. Competition leads them to use private treaty no matter
what their opponent does while the sellers would be better-off under joint-proﬁt maxi-
mization.
When T > T ∗, that is when the degree of product differentiation is large enough, a
symmetric situation arises. In that case, there are two possible conﬁgurations of equi-
libria. The 2 symmetric equilibria or auction as a dominant strategy equilibrium. In
any case, the best reply to auction is never private treaty. The seller is no longer inter-
ested in extending his market share at the expense of efﬁciency. Because products are
more different, competition is somehow relaxed, and auction can arise in equilibrium.
Lemma 7: The equilibrium payoff at (A,A) is Pareto dominant. (The proof is
trivial.)
Indeed, whenever (A,A) is played in equilibrium, the sellers reach a situation
where they maximize their revenue.
6 Conclusion
This papers formalizes the following simple idea: as sellers become more concerned
about guaranteeing a sale, they are willing to give up on efﬁciency to potentially gain
market share. This may lead them to an inefﬁcient outcome. As intuition suggests,
whether they are willing to do so depend on how differentiated the products they sell
are. It also depends on the degree of inefﬁciency they will have to tolerate to increase
their market share.
From a theoretical point of view, it would be interesting to consider a model where
a competing sellers could chose between auctioning to n interested buyers, versus
auctioning to a subset of interested buyers that need not include the ones with the
highest valuations.
7 Appendix
• Appendix 1: Proof of lemma 1.
We need to show that if a buyer acts as depicted, it is in his opponent’s interest to
adopt the same strategy. Assume the value θ∗
S exists and consider all possible choices
of selling mechanisms.
14Let S = (A,A). Consider a buyer with type θ ∈ [0,1]. Let πB
1A (θ) denote this

































de θ if θ ≥ θ∗
AA
(4)
where e θ denotes his opponent’s valuation. Let πB
2A (θ) denote this buyer’s surplus upon













































Thus, the function πB
1A (θ) − πB
2A (θ) is decreasing.
At θ = 0 : π
B
1A (0) − π
B
2A (0) = π
B
1A (0) > 0
At θ = 1 : π
B
1A (1) − π
B
2A (1) = −π
B
2A (1) < 0.
There is therefore a single value θ∗








AA = 1 − F (θ
∗
AA). (6)
From (6) we have obviously θ∗
AA ∈ ]0,1[. Finally, all buyers such that θ < θ∗
AA (resp.
such that θ > θ∗
AA) are such that πB
1A (θ) > πB
2A (θ) (resp. πB
1A (θ) < πB
2A (θ)) and will
therefore attend seller 1 (resp. seller 2).
Let S = (P,A). Consider a buyer with type θ ∈ [0,1]. Let πB
1P (θ) denote this

















t(1 − θ)[1 − F (θ
∗
PA) + (1 − α)(β(F(θ
∗
PA) − F(θ)) + (1 − β)F(θ))]








PA)(1 − α)(1 − β)]
15if θ ≥ θ∗
PA.
If this buyer attends seller 2’s auction his surplus will be given by expression (5)









0 given that β ≥ 1/2. Thus, the function πB
1P (θ) − πB
2A (θ) is decreasing, with
πB
1P (0)−πB
2A (0) > 0 and πB
1P (1)−πB















PA) + (1 − α)(1 − β)F(θ
∗
PA)]. (7)
From the above, one can easily check that θ∗
PA is indeed an interior solution. Finally,
it is true that all buyers such that θ < θ∗
PA (respectively such that θ < θ∗
PA) will attend
seller 1 (resp. seller 2).
Let S = (A,P). The surplus to a buyer attending seller 1 is given by expression
(4) where we should replace θ∗
AA by θ∗
AP. Let πB
2P (θ) denote the surplus to a type θ
buyer when attending seller 2’s private treaty. We have:
π
B
2P (θ) = tθ[F(θ
∗
AP) + (1 − α)(1 − F(θ
∗
AP))(1 − β)]



















AP) + (1 − α)(β (F(θ) − F(θ
∗
AP)) + (1 − β)(1 − F(θ)))]
if θ ≥ θ∗
AP.
Once again, if we assume that θ∗






1A (θ) − πB









AP) + (1 − α)(1 − β)(1 − F(θ
∗
AP))]. (8)
One can easily check that there exists a single interior solution to the above equation.
And the way buyers select which seller to go to follows the same logical argument as
above.




PP, give the surplus to a type θ buyer when attending seller 1 and 2 as both use
private treaty. Once again if we assume that θ∗
PP is an interior solution, the function
πB
1P (θ)−πB
2P (θ) is decreasing. We have πB
1P (0)−πB
2P (0) > 0 and πB
1P (1)−πB
2P (1) <
0. The indifferent consumer is uniquely deﬁned and such that
1 = F(θ
∗
PP))[1 − (1 − β)(1 − α)] + θ
∗
PP [1 + (1 − β)(1 − α)]
From the above one can verify that θ∗
PP is indeed an interior solution.
• Appendix 2: proof of proposition 2.
Let θα ≡ θPA. Under assumption 1, we have θAP = 1 − θα. Moreover, we know
that θα is decreasing in α and θ1 = θAA = 1/2. Assume that πS (P,A) is concave in
α. Note that πS (A,A) is constant with respect to α.
Let T1A be such that πS (P,A)

 






α=0 = a(θ0)(1 − T).
Thus, T1A solves




a(θ0) − a(θ1) + b(θ1)
. (9)
Since a(.) is an increasing function (see (??) in Appendix 2) and θ0 > θ1 : a(θ0) −
a(θ1) > 0. Moreover, b(θ1) > 0. Thus the expression on the right side of (9) is always
strictly within the interval [0,1]. Since πS (P,A)

 




α=0 > πS (A,A) for T < T1A and πS (P,A)

 
α=0 < πS (A,A) for T > T1A.






























is given by expression (??) in Appendix 2 and b0(.) =
db(θα)
dθα
17is given by expression (??) in Appendix 2.



































































Given the assumption 2 we have T2A > T1A. Indeed, by construction we have
T1A = gA (0). Moreover, T2A = limα→1 gA (α). Since gA (α) is increasing in α under
assumption 2, we have T1A < T2A.
We can now summarize our ﬁndings in a table:





































• Appendix 3: Proof of proposition 3.
Let b θα ≡ θPA. By construction b θα is increasing in α and b θ1 = θPP = 1/2. Let T1P



























































































Let T2P be such that πS (A,P)

 
α=0 = πS (P,P)

 
α=0. Thus, T2P solves:
a(b θ0)(1 − T2P) + T2Pb(b θ0) − a(b θ1)(1 − T2P) = 0.
Let
F(T) = a(b θ0)(1 − T) + Tb(b θ0) − a(b θ1)(1 − T).






a(b θ0) − a(b θ1)
i
> 0. Thus, there exists a unique T = T2P such that F(T2P) =

















Under assumption 2, we necessarily have T2P > T1P. This is so because T2P =
gP(0) and T1P = limα→1 gP (α). Since gP(.) is decreasing in α under assumption 2,
we have T2P > T1P.
We can now summarize our ﬁndings in a table:



































































Under assumption 3, the only possible outcome from the above table is given in
ﬁgure 2.
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